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At their Louvre meeting in February 1987, the Group of Seven (G7) 
countries agreed to stabilize dollar exchange rates.  Over the next two years, 
central banks frequently bought and sold dollars in a manner broadly 
consistent with attempting to maintain target zones, and dollar exchange rates 
appeared more stable than they previously had been. 
This paper investigates claims that the G3 (Germany, Japan, and the 
United States) successfully maintained target zones following the Louvre 
meeting.  We use daily, official intervention data and simultaneous-equation 
techniques to estimate Probit reaction functions and GARCH exchange-rate 
equations.  From the reaction functions,  which include variables for target 
zones and market disorder, we construct Mill's  ratios to serve as instruments 
for intervention.  We introduce the Mill's  ratios into both the conditional 
mean and conditional variance of the exchange-rate  equations. 
The results suggest that the G3 reacted to exchange-rate  movements in a 
manner broadly consistent with maintaining target zones.  With some notable 
exceptions, however, we do not find strong evidence that the intervention 
successfully influenced subsequent exchange-rate  movements. 
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This paper investigates claims that the United States, Germany, and 
Japan successfully maintained target zones following the February 20, 1987, 
Louvre meeting of the Group of Seven (G7) nations.  At this meeting, the G7 
countries agreed to stabilize the mark-dollar and yen-dollar exchange rates 
around their current levels through joint intervention.  Although the official 
Louvre Communique made no mention of target zones, Funabashi (1988) shows that 
the participating finance ministers and central-bank  governors, encouraged 
primarily by France and the United States, sought to implement them.  Over the 
next two years, central banks frequently intervened, both buying and selling 
dollars in a manner broadly consistent with attempting to maintain target 
zones, and dollar exchange rates did appear more stable than they previously 
had been. 
To investigate the target-zone  hypothesis, we estimate two-equation 
systems for the mark-dollar and yen-dollar exchange rates, using official 
intervention data and simultaneous-equation techniques.  Our first set of 
equations presents Probit reaction functions that calculate the probability of 
German, Japanese, and U.S. intervention as functions of a target-zone  variable 
and of proxies for disorderly market conditions.  From each reaction function, 
we compute a Mill's  ratio to serve subsequently as an instrument for 
intervention in our exchange-rate  equations.  This second set of exchange-rate 
equations uses generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) techniques to model the influence of intervention on  both the 
conditional mean and the conditional variance of the exchange-rate  process. 
Our results suggest that Germany, Japan, and the United States did 
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attempt to maintain a target zone for both the mark-dollar and yen-dollar 
exchange rates, but that official dollar interventions generally failed to 
alter the direction of errant exchange rates.  This could explain why the 
Group of Three (G3) seemed to abandon target zones by late 1988. 
Nevertheless, some of the results suggest that although intervention did not 
reverse exchange-rate movements, it may have smoothed them.  We also find that 
intervention had mixed effects on exchange-rate  volatility over the post- 
Louvre period. 
Section I of this paper presents models for the Probit reaction 
functions and the GARCH exchange-rate equations.  We estimate these models in 
section 11.  Here we discuss the construction of variables, notably our target 
estimates, and we describe the results in a fairly technical sense.  In 
section 111, we relate our findings to other research in this area. 
I.  he  Model 
Reaction function 
Central banks buy and sell foreign exchange to influence trend movements 
in exchange rates, to calm disorderly markets, to alter their reserve 
holdings, and to fulfill a variety of customer transactions.  We define 
intervention as official transactions to influence spot exchange rates and 
therefore consider only the first two of these motives.  Intervention to 
affect the trend movements in exchange rates could include "leaning against 
(or with) the wind" or maintaining target zones.  Intervention to calm 
disorderly markets lacks a precise definition,  but officials generally 
identify disorderly markets in terms of short-term  volatility.  Our definition 
of intervention conforms to what Adams and Henderson (1983) classify as 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm"activen  intervention. 
We model post-louvre  intervention as a function of a triggering 
mechanism that initiates intervention to alter trend movements in the exchange 
rate and as a function of a vector of variables that attempts to capture 
disorderly market conditions: 
B  B  (la)  zF,t  = 70  + Ti ,,TI  + D?, tri 
B 
+  ei,t, 
(lb)  ~s,t=ro+~s,trs+~s,tr;+~s,t. 
In our model, the superscripts B and S refer to intervention purchases and 
sales of U.S.  dollars, respectively,  and the subscript i (-  1,2) indexes the 
intervening country.  In equation (la) , z;,  is intervention purchases of 
dollars by the ith central bank at time period t; T:  is the corresponding 
target-zone  triggering mechanism at time t,  and D:  is a time-t  vector of 
terms that defines disorderly markets.  Corresponding definitions apply to 
equation (lb).  All central banks react to the same trigger mechanisms and to 
the same measures of disorderly markets.  We also assume that 
(3a)  E(G;,~)  =  0 when i*j  , 
(3b)  E(&, e;)  =  0 when i*  j , 
and 
As we will  explain in section 11, we  include the  lamed conditional 
variance from the exchange-rate  equations  as a  measure of  disorderly  markets [see 
equations (7) and (14)l. 
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A substantial body of literature suggests that exchange rates follow a 
martingale process with a heteroscedastic error term.  The GARCH model 
initially proposed by Bollerslev (1986) is particularly well suited to 
variables exhibiting such behavior.  The GARCH framework is also conducive 
to the study of intervention because it allows us to estimate simultaneously a 
conditional-mean  equation and a conditional-variance equation, both of which 
can accommodate intervention terms on the right-hand side.  We interpret 
intervention in the conditional-mean  equation as measuring the impact of 
intervention on trend exchange-rate  movements, and we regard intervention in 
the conditional-variance equation as measuring the ability of intervention to 
calm disorderly markets.  Our exchange-rate  model is 
(5)  AS,  = Xt6i  + Z,62  +  e,, 
(6)  etlnt-l  - t(O,h,,v), 
In equation (5),  AS,  is the log change in the spot exchange rate at time 
t from time t-1;  Xt  is a vector of exogenous variables, and zt  is a vector 
,  of domestic and foreign intervention variables, such that 
B 
I  (8)  zt =  rztt1  zzpt1  zttI ZLI. 
Equation (6) indicates that the distribution of the error term is conditional 
on information available at time t-1.  By modeling the errors with a student-t 
distribution, we assume that the distribution is symmetric,  but allow that it 
Bollerslev extended previous work by Engle (1982). 
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may be leptokurtotic.  The distribution approaches normality as the parameter, 
v, approaches 30.  Equation (7) models the conditional variance, h,,  as an 
ARMA  (p,q)  process and as a function of exogenous variables and interventions 
at time t. 
Instrument 
Under the assumption that central banks maintain target zones, 
intervention and exchange rates are jointly determined.  Direct estimation of 
this model will give biased and inconsistent results, because 
(9)  Cov(Z,r)+O. 
Probit estimation techniques allow us to construct an instrumental variable 
for the intervention terms without abandoning the GARCH frame~ork.~  To re- 
write equations (la) and (lb), our criterion functions for intervention, in' 
the standard form of a Probit model, we define vectors 
and 
1 if  Z:,,  > 0, 
otherwise. 
Then, equations (la) and (lb) become 
(lla) 1f.t = 70 + rtB7;  + DtB7;  + d,t, 
(llb) ISnt  = 7;  + r,S7: + Df7;  + ps,t. 
After obtaining maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in equations 
See Maddala (1983) and Heckman (1979). 
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(lla) and (llb), we calculate inverse Mill's  ratios, designated by  XB or As 
below, such that 
(124  A:,,  =  (4[f1(TB,DB)I/(@[fl(~B,~B)I),  if Itt  =  1 
(12b) A:,,  =  (4[f1(TB,DB)]/1  -@[fl(TB,DB)]),  if  = 0. 
We construct similar inverse Mill's  ratios for intervention sales of dollars. 
In these expressions for the inverse Mill's  ratios, 4  and @  are the 
standard normal density function and the cumulative standard normal density 
function, respectively.  The Mill's  ratios, XB and AS,  are monotone 
decreasing functions of the probability that the corresponding central bank 
does not intervene, (1 - @[fl(.) ]  ) . 
As a second stage, we estimate the GARCH model in a form that allows the 
instrumental variables for intervention to enter both the conditional-mean  and 
conditional-variance equations: 
(13)  ASt =  60 + Xt61  +  +  ct, 
(14)  €,In,-1  - t(O,a",), 
where 
(16)  At =  [G,t,  ~?,t,  1:,t,  $,tl 
and where 6,,  6,,  rl, and 7,  are corresponding vectors of parameters. 
11.  Estimation 
We estimate these models for U.S. and German intervention against the 
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mark-dollar  exchange rate and for U.S. and Japanese intervention against the 
yen-dollar  exchange rate from February 23, 1987,  through February 23, 1990. 
Our data set includes 757 daily observations.  We also estimate the model over 
two subperiods: February 23,  1987,  to September 30,  1988;  and October 3,  1988, 
to February 23, 1990.  Based on an inspection of the data,  the former period 
seems more consistent  with the target-zone  hypothesis than the latter period. 
These subperiods contain 408 and 349 observations,  respectively. 
All exchange rates are from the New York market.  All intervention data 
are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and are 
maintained in dollars.  Since the Louvre meeting of the G3,  U.S. intervention 
policy has focused exclusively on the mark-dollar and yen-dollar  exchange 
rates,  and the United States has conducted all of its intervention in these 
currencies.  Our estimates of the mark-dollar  equations incorporate only U.S. 
and German intervention in dollars against marks.  Similarly,  our estimates of 
the yen-dollar  equations utilize only U.S. and Japanese intervention in 
dollars against yen.  We do not consider the effects of dollar,  mark, or yen 
intervention by other central banks that could have influenced the mark-dollar 
or yen-dollar  exchange rates through cross exchange rates. 
Appendix A provides a detailed description of the raw data used in our 
experiment.  The remainder of this section outlines our approach to estimating 
the model.  We estimated the GARCH model from a package used in Baillie and 
Bollerslev (1989).  We used Shazam version 6.2  for all other data calculations 
and to estimate the Probit functions. 
Reaction functions 
Funabashi provides a detailed discussion of the alleged post-Louvre 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmtarget zones,  including a somewhat  vague empirical description of agreed 
intervention ranges.4  A  comparison of G3 intervention data with morning- 
opening New York exchange-rate  quotations suggests that the 63  countries did 
attempt to pursue target zones for the mark-dollar  and yen-dollar  exchange 
rates,  but the pattern did not seem to fit Funabashi's description.  Table 1 
identifies exchange rates that seemed to trigger intervention.'  The behavior 
of intervention against the mark-dollar  exchange rate seemed more consistent 
with the idea of a target zone than did intervention against the yen-dollar 
exchange rate, in that we could identify fewer changes in the mark-dollar 
intervention trigger.  By late 1988,  however,  we had difficulty specifying 
targets for intervention against either exchange rate.  This determined our 
choice of subperiods. 
During the post-Louvre  period, central banks seemed to intervene 
whenever the exchange rate breached the upper or lower target zone,  and they 
generally continued to intervene as long as the exchange rate moved away from 
the trigger point.  When an exchange rate began to move back toward the 
target,  even if it remained outside the target zone,  the central banks nearly 
always halted intervention.  This approach would limit the drain on foreign 
currency reserves or would minimize the exchange-risk  exposure associated with 
4~t  the  Louvre meeting, finance ministers  and  central-bank presidents 
indicated their willingness to stabilize exchange rates "around  current levels." 
Nevertheless,  they did not seem to agree on  a precise definition  of  target  zones. 
Opinions varied about the central rates and about countries' obligations given 
various percentage deviations from those central rates.  See Funabashi (1988). 
'~lein  and Lewis (1991) estimate target  mark-dollar  and yen-dollar  exchange 
rates with upper and lower boundaries representing a 50  percent probability of 
intervention.  Their estimation  period runs from March 13,  1987 through October 
9,  1987.  They find that " .  .  . the market's perception of the target zone shifted 
significantly during the period." (p. 25) 
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acquiring foreign currency reserves, as the case may have been."ometimes 
an exchange rate would never fully recover to within the target zone before 
starting to deviate again, and central banks would seem to wait before again 
intervening.  We interpret these later situations as representing a re- 
benchmarking of the target zones. 
Accordingly, we construct the target-zone  variable in the following 
manner  : 
(17)  TL =bL.dL(SAML-S4). 
In equation (17), SAML is  the hypothesized lower bound of the target zone 
based on the morning-opening  New York quotation.  (All exchange rates are in 
log form.)  We let bL equal one when the spot exchange rate fell below the 
lower bound, or  (SAML-S4)  > 0. Otherwise bL is zero.  We let dL equal one 
only when the spot exchange rate depreciated, (SAMt-SAMt-,)  < 0. The terms bL 
and dL switch on the intervention signal whenever the exchange rate was below 
the lower target zone and was depreciating.  We expect the estimated 
coefficient on TL in the central-bank reaction functions to be positive.  If 
central banks reacted to deviations in spot exchange rates from a target zone, 
we expect greater purchases of dollars (a positive value) to be associated 
with increases in TL. 
We construct a similar variable for the upper target range and expect 
its coefficient to be negative.  When the spot rate rose above its target 
value, TH  becomes negative; the intervening central bank should have sold 
dollars (a positive value).  We estimate separate equations for each country's 
decision to buy and to sell dollars, using the appropriate exchange-rate 
6~or  a discussion of central-bank exposure and the profitability of U.S. 
intervention, see Leahy (1989). 
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We include two variables to gauge market disorder in the Probit reaction 
functions.  One variable is dollar appreciations or depreciations, whether 
these occur inside or outside the target bands.  We include the absolute value 
of dollar appreciations (depreciations) in the reaction functions for dollar 
sales (purchases).  We expect a positive coefficient for each.  For the United 
States, we measure the appreciation or depreciation as the change in the 
morning-opening exchange-rate quotes from the previous closing quotes: 
(SAM,  - SPM,-,).  For Germany and Japan,  we measure the change in the previous 
day's  closing quote from the previous day's  opening quote:  (SPMt-,  - SAM,-,). 
This assures us that the exchange-rate  changes are recent and that they occur 
before the intervention response. 
As a second measure of disorderly markets, we include the square root of 
the lagged conditional variance from the exchange-rate equation; that is, we 
include hi!:,  where ht-, is defined by equation (15).  To do this, we first 
estimate a Probit reaction function, which contains only the trigger variable 
and the appreciation/depreciation  variable, over the lagged data.  We generate 
Mill's  ratios  (A!,,-,,  A:,,-,,  A:,,-,,  and, using these as instruments of 
intervention, we estimate the conditional mean and conditional variance of the 
exchange-rate  process over the same lagged time period.  We capture the lagged 
conditional variance from this equation and use its square root in the 
contemporaneous Probit reaction functions reported be10w.~ 
We also test for day-of-the-week  effects in the intervention reaction 
We also consider the bid-ask spread as a measure of disorderly markets. 
Overall, they performed similarly.  We did not include them in the equations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmfunctions.  Dominguez (1988) suggests that U.S. intervention might be related 
to announcements about U.S. money growth.  Because the Federal Reserve 
releases money data on Thursdays and because the Bundesbank often announces 
policy intentions on  Thursdays,  Dominguez's hypothesis suggests that we 
consider day-of-the-week  effects in the intervention reaction functions.  We 
include four day-of-the-week  dummies in lagged Probit functions that we 
estimated over the full period.  Using likelihood-ratio  tests,  we could not 
reject the null hypothesis of no day-of-the-week  effects (see table 2). 
Moreover,  no individual coefficient was statistically significant. 
For each market, we estimate three sets of contemporaneous reaction 
functions: one set for the United States, one set for Germany or Japan,  and 
one set for a combination of the United States and its foreign counterpart. 
Over this period,  central banks closely coordinated their intervention.  The 
estimated Probit reaction functions appear in tables 3.0.-  for the full 
period, in tables 3.1.-  for the first subperiod,  and in tables 3.2.-  for the 
final subperiod. 
The models seem to fit the data well,  with two notable exceptions. 
During the first subperiod,  Japan  made no sales of dollars,  and the U.S.  made 
relatively few (see table 4).  For this subperiod,  we could not identify an 
upper target exchange rate (see table l),  nor could we relate U.S. 
We number tables 3,  5,  and 6  as follows: The first digit refers to the 
overall table number.  The second digit designates the time period,  with 0  for 
the full period  (February 23, 1987, to February 23, 1990),  1 for the first 
subperiod  (February 23, 1987, to  September 30, 1988)  and 2  for the  second 
subperiod (October 3,  1988,  to February 23,  1990).  The letters  G and J indicate 
the foreign currency under consideration.  Hence, table 3  .O.G refers to the 
reaction function estimated  over  the  entire  sample for dollar  intervention 
against German marks. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmintervention to other reaction-function   variable^.^  During the final sub- 
period (October 3,  1988,  to February 23,  1990),  the United States and/or 
Germany bought dollars on only 8  of the 349 business days in the sample.  The 
Probit model would not converge over this subperiod.1° 
In  all other cases, the upper and lower target mechanisms are 
significant at the 99 percent confidence level.  This suggests that the 
central banks did attempt to maintain target zones in the manner that we 
hypothesized.  Although the target-zone  variables remain significant in the 
second subperiod,  the target exchange rate changes more frequently and becomes 
increasingly difficult to identify. 
In the mark-dollar  market, the appreciation/depreciation variables for 
the full period are significant at the 95  percent confidence level for the 
United States and at the 90  percent confidence level for Germany and both 
countries combined.  An inspection of the subperiods suggests that during the 
first subperiod,  German monetary authorities were not inclined to intervene 
against a dollar appreciation,  but did react to dollar depreciations.  Both 
countries reacted to dollar appreciations in the second subperiod.  In the 
yen-dollar  market, the appreciation/depreciation variable is not significant, 
with the exception that the United States tends to buy dollars when the dollar 
We  generated  a Mill's  ratio for this period by  estimating a  Probit 
function,  using only a constant.  Although the Probit function  does not  converge 
properly, it produces  a Mill's  ratio that  is perfectly  correlated with  the 
dichotomous intervention term and that is of the proper scale for inclusion in 
the exchange-rate  equations. 
lo  We altered some estimation procedures as we worked through this paper. 
The different treatments of the mark-dollar  and yen-dollar  Probit functions  here 
are a case in  point (see footnote 9).  Throughout this paper,  we note each of the 
procedural changes at the appropriate  point.  None affects the overall results. 
Our final paper will standardize all cases. 
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depreciates against the yen.  This tendency seems to result only in the second 
subperiod. 
The second measure of disorderly markets, the squared root of the 
conditional variance term,  was significant in about half the cases.  In all 
cases,  except for the yen-dollar  exchange rate in the last subperiod, 
volatility, measured by the conditional variance, tends to lead to dollar 
purchases more often than to dollar sales.  The opposite holds in the yen- 
dollar market over the last subperiod. 
Exchanpe-rate  eauation 
Tables 5.-.-  and 6.-.-  present our estimates of the exchange-rate 
equations.  We define the dependent variable in the exchange-rate  equations as 
the log change in the New York closing exchange-rate  quote (SPM,-SPM,-,).  We 
assume that all intervention recorded at time t occurs between these two 
quotations. 
The interpretation of coefficients on intervention terms is always 
difficult.  Successful intervention undertaken after an exchange rate has 
breached a target boundary should return the exchange rate back to within the 
target range.  Accordingly,  one expects  extramarginal intervention sales 
(purchases) of dollars to be associated with dollar depreciations 
(appreciations).  When intervention occurs within the target range (intra- 
marginal interventions), its objective might be to smooth the exchange-rate 
path, but not to reverse it.  Dollar sales (purchases) could be associated 
with dollar depreciations (appreciations), yet still smooth the exchange-rate 
path from what it otherwise might have been.  Unfortunately, one never knows 
what the exchange rate otherwise would have done, so one can never 
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unambiguously interpret such coefficients. 
By far, most of the intervention undertaken following the Louvre meeting 
of the G7 occurs after the exchange rate breaches the target boundary as 
defined in this paper  (see table 4).  Nevertheless, we still face some 
ambiguities in the interpretations of coefficients on the exchange-rate 
equations, partly because some intervention in our study is intramarginal and 
partly because, despite the favorable result of the reaction functions, we do 
not have precise information about desired targets.  Consequently, when we 
find intervention dollar sales (purchases) associated with dollar 
depreciations (appreciations), we cannot interpret the coefficient as showing 
a perverse response.  Similar problems, however, confront the managers of 
foreign exchange desks at central banks, and they probably find little solace 
4 
from such patterns. 
Tables 5.-.-  show our estimates of the basic structure of the exchange- 
rate equation prior to testing for the effects of intervention.  In  each case, 
equation 1 provides an initial test for the presence of GARCH effects in the 
exchange-rate process.  We regress the log change in the exchange rate on a 
constant and on a variance term.  In  all cases, the Q-statistics (with 15 
degrees of freedom) suggest that the errors are not serially correlated.  The 
Q-stati~tics~for  the squared error terms, however, are significant, indicating 
heteroscedasticity.  The autocorrelations and partial autocorrelation of the 
error terms (not shown) exhibit mixed patterns, indicative of a GARCH (p,q) 
process. 
In equation 2,  we estimate a GARCH (1,l)  model over each time period. 
In each case, the GARCH parameters are significant; the likelihood function 
increases significantly, and the adjusted Q-statistics no longer show the 
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that the estimated values of the omegas, a,, in the final subperiod for both 
currencies are not significant. 
The B1 and B2 statistics for equations 1 and 2 show that the error terms 
are biased (Bl)  and leptokurtotic (B2),  despite the adoption of a GARCH (1,l) 
model.  In equation 3,  we alter the distribution parameter l/v  to allow a 
non-normal  distribution for the error term.  To do this,  we get initial 
estimates from the B2 statistics and iterate until the values assumed in the 
model and the value implied by the subsequent B2 statistic are close.ll  The 
likelihood function improves as a result of altering the assumed distribution, 
but the error terms continue to be biased and leptokurtotic.  l2 
In equation 4,  we add explanatory terms.  These include short-term 
interest-rate  spreads,  to capture short-term  fluctuations in monetary 
policies, and dummy variables for U.S. and foreign  holidays on which the 
markets were closed.  Interest-rate  spreads were significant,  usually at the 
95 percent confidence level,  in both the conditional-mean  equations and the 
l1 The distribution parameter and the B2 statistic are related according to 
B2 -  [3(v-2)]/(v-4).  We also allowed the model to estimate the distribution 
parameter, but  the  results  universally  seemed too  high  relative to  the  B2 
statistic.  We do not report these results. 
l2 When estimating the model for the mark-dollar  exchange  rate over the full 
time period,  we adjusted the distribution  parameter each time we introduced  a new 
variable  to  the  estimation  sequence.  When  estimating  the  model  for  the 
subperiods, we wondered whether  such a procedure  might  invalidate a  strict 
interpretation  of  the  likelihood  ratio  tests  and  adjusted  the  paradeter 
separately.  In  no  case,  however,  did  a  significant  variable  become 
insignificant,  or vice versa,  following  a change in the distribution  parameter. 
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the entire period and over the first subperiod.  The only exception appears in 
the conditional variance for the yen-dollar exchange rate in the first 
subperiod.  In the final subperiod, the interest-rate terms are not 
significant except in the variance of the yen-dollar exchange rate.  The U.S. 
holiday dummies are usually significant in the conditional-variance equations, 
but not in the conditional-mean equations.  This suggests that exchange-rate 
volatility increases when the market reopens after a holiday.  Most holidays 
fall on  Mondays or Fridays.  Foreign holiday dummies were not significant, 
except for the German holiday dummy in the final subperiod.  The overall 
unimportance of foreign holidays could result because we use New York 
exchange-rate quotations.13 
We also tested for day-of-the-week  effects in both the conditional-mean 
and conditional-variance equations over the entire period  (February 23, 1987, 
through February 23, 1990).  For the German mark, the day-of-the-week  dummies 
were jointly significant neither in the mean (LR test - 5.6) nor in the 
variance  (LR tests - 1.4).  For the Japanese yen, the day-of-the-week  dummies 
also were not jointly significant in the mean equation (LR test - 3.4) nor in 
the variance (LR test - 6.3).  We consequently excluded these regressors. 
Once we determined the basic model, we reestimated the distributional 
parameter  (see footnotes 11 and 12).  We refer to these equations as the basic 
models and maintain their general specification throughout the paper as a base 
l3  Initially, we  intended  to keep  all  nonintervention variables  in  the 
models for each subperiod.  When the intervention terms were added, especially 
to the conditional-variance  equations,  many proved insignificant, and the model 
often would not converge.  This was especially true over the subperiods.  To 
facilitate convergence,  we consequently dropped explanatory terms that proved to 
be  insignificant. 
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for comparing the intervention terms.  In some cases, however, as we added 
explanatory variables to the conditional-variance equations, the alpha 
component of the GARCH (1,l) model became weakly significant or insignificant 
at acceptable levels. 
Intervent  ion 
The tables designated 6.-.-  show the results of adding the intervention 
terms to the basic exchange-rate  equations.  For each exchange rate, we enter 
intervention by the two principal central banks separately and as a summation 
of both.  Over the post-louvre  period, central banks often closely coordinated 
their intervention efforts.  Consequently, corresponding U.S.  and foreign 
intervention terms are collinear, a problem that increases the estimated 
standard errors of the intervention terms and that biases their calculated 
t-statistics downward.  Adding the relevant intervention transactions into a 
signal intervention term eliminates this problem. 
Over the entire time period (table 6.O.G),  German sales of dollars are 
statistically significant at the 90  percent confidence level in both the mean 
and the variance equations.  In the mean equation, the coefficient's  sign 
suggests that intervention sales of dollars promoted a dollar depreciation. 
This is consistent with the successful operation of target zones.  In the 
conditional-variance equation, the coefficient on German dollar sales 
suggests, however, that intervention increased the volatility of the exchange- 
rate process.  Over the entire period, Germany tended to sell dollars three 
times as often as it purchased them. 
When we combine U.S. and German intervention, the estimated coefficients 
are statistically significant in the conditional-mean equation, but their 
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signs do not conform to the target-zone  hypothesis, implying at best that 
central banks managed to smooth exchange-rate  movements during the period. 
The combined intervention terms are not statistically significant in the 
conditional-variance  equations. 
For intervention in the yen-dollar  market over the full sample period 
(table 6.0.J),  the estimated coefficients for Japanese purchases of dollars 
appear statistically significant at the 90  percent confidence level in the 
mean equation.  The sign is not consistent with the target-zone  hypothesis, 
but could indicate a successful smoothing operation.  The coefficients for 
both U.S. and Japanese purchases of dollars are significant in the variance 
equations at the 95 percent level.  The significant,  positive coefficient on 
U.S. intervention sales suggests that intervention increased near-term 
volatility,  while the significant,  negative coefficient on  Japanese dollar 
sales has the opposite implication.  Over this period,  Japan purchased dollars 
1.2 times as often as it sold dollars.  The United States,  however,  tended to 
sell dollars approximately 1.3  times as often as it bought them.  When the 
individual transactions of the separate countries are combined, total 
intervention  purchases are statistically significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level in the mean equation,  with the sign on the coefficient 
indicative of a smoothing operation at best.  Intervention purchases appear 
significant at the 95 percent level in the variance equation, indicating that 
intervention increased market volatility. 
This mixed pattern of results highlights the importance of considering 
subperiods for intervention.  As noted earlier,  by late 1988,  central-bank 
intervention  no longer obviously conformed to a target zone.  Consequently,  we 
split the estimation period at the end of September 1988. 
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Over the first subperiod, the model for the mark-dollar exchange rate 
would not converge when the individual intervention terms were simultaneously 
included in the mean or variance equations.  Table 6.1.G  shows the results of 
entering individual intervention terms.  None of the individual coefficients 
in the conditional-mean  equations conforms with the target-zone  hypothesis. 
The coefficient on German purchases of dollars, however, is statistically 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level.  Its sign suggests that 
intervention, at best, could have smoothed dollar depreciations.  None of the 
individual intervention terms is significant in the conditional variance 
equation.  During this first subperiod, Germany tended to sell dollars nearly 
twice as frequently as it bought dollars. 
When U.S. and German intervention is combined, however, the coefficient 
on intervention sales of dollars in the mean equation proves to be significant 
at the 99 percent confidence level, and its sign is consistent with the 
target-zone  hypothesis.  Overall, the combined transactions to sell dollars 
exceeded the combined transactions to buy dollars by approximately 1.5 times. 
The combined intervention terms are not statistically significant in the 
conditional-variance equations. 
Over the first subperiod, Japan did not undertake intervention sales of 
dollars (see table 6.1.5).  Japanese purchases of dollars are statistically 
significant at the 95 percent level in the mean equation, but with a sign that 
is, at best, consistent with smoothing.  U.S. dollar-sales  are statistically 
significant at the 90 percent level in the variance equation.  The coefficient 
on  U.S. dollar sales in the conditional variance suggests that intervention 
sales of dollars increased exchange-rate volatility.  When we combine the 
intervention terms, the coefficient for dollar purchases is significant at the 
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99 percent level,  and its sign could indicate smoothing.  Both combined dollar 
sales and dollar purchases are significant in the variance equation at the 90 
percent level,  but this intervention seemed to increase exchange-rate 
volatility. 
Because the reaction functions for intervention purchases of dollars 
against German marks in the final subperiod would not converge, the 
corresponding  mark-dollar  exchange-rate  equations consider only intervention 
sales of dollars (see table 6.2.G).  Between October 3,  1988,  and February 23, 
1990,  Germany bought dollars on only seven occasions and the United States 
bought dollars on only four occasions.  During the final subperiod,  none of 
the intervention terms in the conditional-mean  equations is consistent with 
the target-zone  hypothesis.  The coefficient for combined dollar sales is 
statistically significant,  but its coefficient is positive, suggesting that 
intervention could have smoothed trend exchange-rate  movements, but did not 
reverse them.  In no case during the second subperiod is intervention 
significant in the conditional variance of the mark-dollar  equations. 
We had difficulty getting the equation with individual interventions 
against Japanese yen to converge with intervention in the variance equation, 
so we present equations with only U.S. intervention in the variance (see table 
6.2.5).  Only U.S. purchases of dollars are significant in the mean equation, 
with a sign suggesting at best a smoothing operation.  By  allowing the 
distribution parameter v  to iterate,  we were able to estimate a model with 
all of the intervention terms in both the mean and variance equation.  Again, 
only U.S. intervention in the mean was significant.  The estimate of the 
distribution parameter and its t-statistic,  however,  seems too large.  When 
U.S. and Japanese intervention is combined,  intervention is not statistically 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsignificant. 
111.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we constructed a Probit reaction function and a GARCH 
exchange-rate model to investigate U.S.  and German intervention in the post- 
Louvre period.  We found that, after the Louvre meeting, Germany, Japan, and 
the United States reacted to exchange-rate movements in a manner consistent 
with an attempt to maintain a target-zone  mechanism.  They adjusted the target 
zone periodically, but with increasing frequency as time passed.  By late 
1988,  however, we found it difficult to specify target exchange rates. 
Although most intervention was extramarginal by our definition of the target 
range, not all of it was. 
During the post-Louvre period, the G3 countries also intervened in 
response to indications of market disorder.  Countries sold (purchased) 
dollars in the face of dollar appreciations (depreciations), and market 
volatility, measured by the lagged conditional variance of the exchange-rate 
process, often influenced the probability of G3 intervention. 
Results from estimating the reaction functions were fairly consistent 
over different time periods, across different currencies, and with respect to 
intervention purchases and sales.  Results from estimating the exchange-rate 
equations, on the other hand, were not consistent.  In the conditional mean 
equations, for example, we find some cases in which intervention reversed 
exchange-rate movements, and we find other cases in which intervention may 
have smoothed exchange-rate  movements, even if it did fail to reverse them. 
Nevertheless, the sign and significance of the various coefficients change 
across time periods.  Results that hold for sales of dollars often do not hold 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm2  2 
for purchases of dollars.  We find similar patterns in the variance 
equations,  with cases in which the coefficients showed that intervention 
significantly increased exchange-rate  volatility and others in  which 
intervention significantly lowered exchange-rate  volatility.  Yet,  again, the 
pattern was never consistent across time periods, currencies,  or types of 
intervention transaction. 
These types of results for the conditional mean of exchange-rate 
processes now seem fairly standard among empirical investigations of 
intervention,  as recent surveys by Edison (1990) and Humpage (1991) indicate. 
Together with a lack of strong support for a portfolio effect, they have led 
many researchers to conclude that intervention affects exchange rates by 
influencing market expectations [see Hung (1991a, 1991b)l.  The impact of 
official transaction in foreign currency then depends on current market 
conditions and on the perceived information embodied in the intervention.  l4 
Even studies that find a fairly consistent portfolio-balance  effect note that 
the expectational influence of intervention is vital in determining the 
overall effectiveness of intervention [see Dominguez and Frankel (1991)l. 
Recent theoretical work on target zones also might help to explain our 
failure to find compelling support for intervention,  particularly the ability 
of intervention to reverse exchange-rate  movements.  Krugman (1991) indicates 
that if markets expect intervention at particular target exchange rates,  these 
expectations alone will help stabilize the exchange rate within known target 
rates.  Klein (1990),  Klein and Lewis (1991), and Lewis (1990) extend this 
result to show that the expectation of intramarginal intervention further 
14This  need not be information solely about future monetary policies.  See 
Dominguez (1988) and Klein and Rosengren (1991). 
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stabilizes the exchange rate.  Therefore, if market participants anticipated 
intervention to maintain target zones in the post-Louvre  period, they would 
incorporate this into their quotations.  Researchers then might find no 
correlation between intervention and exchange-rate  movements, even though the 
threat of intervention altered the exchange-rate  path. 
These results assume that intervention targets were announced or that 
they evolved in a manner that allowed the market to learn governments' 
reaction functions.  In the post-Louvre  period, however, the G3 did not 
announce the target bands, nor even acknowledge that they existed.  Moreover, 
the target bands were not fixed.  It is not clear that following the Louvre 
meeting, the market was ever able to predict the G3 intervention points. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that they may have done so, intervention could 
have helped stabilize the exchange rate despite our inability to find a 
strong, consistent effect of intervention in the exchange-rate equations. 
Like nearly all other empirical investigations of intervention, this 
paper has presented a statistical model of intervention, not a theoretical 
model.  Moreover, we followed convention by assuming that intervention was 
sterilized.  Nevertheless, we suspect that central banks did not completely 
divorce their post-Louvre intervention from their monetary policy.  Pauls 
(1990) and Furlong (1989) both indicate that following the Louvre meeting, 
exchange-rate considerations became more important in FOMC deliberations. 
Neumann and von Hagen (1991) indicate that Germany does not always sterilize 
its intervention completely, as does Takagi (1989) for Japan.  Although the 
interest-rate variable in our model sometimes seems sensitive to the 
intervention terms, preliminary tests suggest that collinearity is not a 
problem.  This is an important area for further analysis.  The working 
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assumption of most research on intervention, that intervention is sterilized, 
might not be entirely appropriate. 
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Apparent Exchange-Rate  Target Ranges 
(foreign currency units per dollar) 
I.  German mark -  U.S. dollar 
Date of Change: 
February 20, 1987 
December 22, 1987 
July 1, 1988 
March 3, 1989 
July 3, 1989 
December 1, 1989 
11.  Japanese yen -  U.S. dollar 
Date of Change: 
February 20, 1987 
June 1, 1987 
September 3, 1987 
November 16, 1987 
January 20, 1988 
April 18, 1988 
June 20, 1988 
December 9,  1988 
May 2, 1989 
August 11, 1989 








150.  OY 
142.5Y 
140.  OY 
133.  OY 
126.  OY 
124.  OY 
126.  OY 
122.  OY 







130.  OY 
133.  OY 
140.  OY 
144.  OY 
* Value is not apparent; we maintain previous value. 
" Not obvious,  but previous value no longer applies. 
Note:  High and low targets are based on a comparison of official intervention 
with morning-opening  New York exchange-rate  quotations. 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests for Day-of-the-Week  Effects 
in the Reaction Functions 
Intervention aeainst marks  Utervention aeainst yen 
Purchases  Sales  Purchases  Sales 
United States  0.6 
Germany  6.4 
Japan  * 
* Does not apply. 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  3.0.6:  PROBIT  REACTION  FUCTIONS:  INTERVENTION  ACAINST.G€RllAW MKS 
Estimation Period:  February 23,  1987 to Fcbrusry 23, 1990 
I  IEQUATION  1  EWATION  2  EQUATION  3  EQUATION 4  EQUTION 5  EQUTION 6  1 
I  I------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  I 
I  (  US Dollar  US Dollar  Geman Dollar Germen  Dollar Total Dollar  Total Dollar  I 
I  1  Sales  Purchases  Sales  Purchases  Sales  Purchases  1 
I-------------------------------------------------------------*---------------------------------------------  I 
I  I  I 
ICmstant  (  -1.3392  -3.0040  -1.0320  -2.9108  -1.0509  -2.2073  1 
I  I(-4.3504)  (-6.5948)  (-3.7259)  (-7.0874)  (-3.7659)  (-5.5855)  1 
I  I 
lUpper  target  1  -33.837  -21.606  -29.573  I 
I 
I  1  (-8.6436)  (-5.8337)  (-7.4533)  I 
I  I  I 
(Lower  target  I  28.174  21.685  27.984  1 
I  I  (7.4609)  (6.0m7)  (7.3437)  1 
I  I 
l-eciation  1  0.70374  0.35055  0.33648  I 
I 
I  1  (3.4575)  (1 .7763)  (  1  .7343)  I 
I  I  I 
IDepreciation  I  0.53044  0.39949  0.47914  1 
I  1  (2.3204)  (1.8122)  (2.2929)  1 
I  I 
I  -0.1025 
I 
lh(t-1)  1.4677  -0.12727  1.5977  0.0840  0.68433  1 
1  I  (-0.2225)  (2.3230)  (-0.30652)  (2.7760)  (0.2003)  (1.1731)  1 
I  I 
lLog  Likelihood  1  -273.83  -1  11 -39  -332.88  -138.82  -362 -38  -157.12  1 
I 
I  I  I 
ILikelihood ratio test  (  86.9286  72.7387  44.1000  52.5353  74.1508  74.9647  1 
I  I  (df=3)  (df=3)  (df=3)  (df=3)  (dfJ)  (df=3)  I 
I  I 
95  -376% 
I 
lcorrectly predicted  1  86.394%  81 -374%  94.3201;  m.65?%  43.527%  1 
I  I 
llotal hrvations  I  757  757  757  757  757  757  I 
I 
I  I  I 
IObservationsatl  I  112  37  135  43  167  54  1 
I  I  I 
(Observatiorrs at 0  1  645  720  622  714  590  703  I 
............................................................................................................ 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  3.0.5:  PROBIT  REACTICU  FUICTIONS:  INTERVENTION AGAINST  JAPANESE  YEN 
Estimtion  Period:  February 23,  1987  to February 23, 1990 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I  IEQUATION  1  EQUATION 2  EWATIOl 3  EWATIOl 4  EQUATION  5  EQUATION 6  1 
I  I----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  I 
I  I US  Dollar  US  Dollar  Jepenese Dollar Japanase Dollar Total Dollar  Total Dollar  I 
I  I  Sales  Purchases  Sales  ---------------- 
Purchases  Sala  Purchases  I 
I-------------------------------------------------- 
I  I 
IConstant  I  -2.205  -2.2700 
I  1  (-9.282)  (-8.609) 
I  I 
(Upper target  I  -31.066 
I  1  (-7.240) 
I  I 
JLwr  target  I  28.707 
I  I  (7.076) 
I  I 
JApprriation  1  0.149 
I  I  (0.776) 
I  I 
IDeprriation  I  0.647 
I  I  (3.431) 
I  I 
ih(t-0  1  1.062  0.753 
1  (3.33)  (2.155) 
I  I 
lLog Likelihood  1  -216.04  -177.79 
I  I 
ILikelihood ratio test  1  99.744  87.817 
I  I  (df=3)  (df=3) 
I  I 
ICorrrtly  predicted  I  90.000%  91 -400% 
I  I 
ITotal observations  I  757  757 
I  I 
(Observations at 1  I  85  65 
I  I 
IObservations at 0  1  672  692 
Source:  Authors'  calculatims. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  3.1.6:  PROBIT  REACTIaW  FUleTIaWS:  INTERVEYTIW AGAIYST  GERMAN  MKS 
Estiumtim Period:  February 23, 1987 to  Septhr  30,  1988 
I  I  US  Dollar 
I  1  sales  I------------------------------------ 
I  I 
1 Constant  1  -2.0049 
I  1  (-4.0371) 
I  I 
1-r  target  I  -55.563 
I  1  (-6.5546) 
I  I 
1 Lower  target  I 
I  I 
I  I 
IAppreciaticm  I  0.70819 
I  (  (2.0321) 
I  I 
lDepreciaticm  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I%-1)  I  0.~259 
1  (0.45165) 
I  I 
lLog  likelihood  1  -93.942 
I  I 
(Likelihood ratio test  1  50.9379 
I  I  (df=3) 
I  I 
lcorrectly predicted  (  92.647X 
I  I 
(Total observations  I  408 
I  I 
Iwervations at 1  I  35 
I  I 
ICbservatiorrr at 0  I  373 
US  Do1 Lar 
Purchases  -------------- 
Gemn Dollar Gemn Do1 lar Total Do1 lar 
Ssles  Purchases  Sales 
-----------------------------------------. 
Total Do1 lar  1 
Purchases  1 
Scurce:  Authors1 calculat iars. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  3.1.5:  -11  REACTlCU  NYCIIOYS:  JAPAUESE  YEN 
Estinmtion Perfod:  Febnmry t3, 1987 to  Septeaber 30,  1988 
I  I US Dollar  US Dollar  Japwme  Japmcsc  Total Dollar  Total Dollar 
1  I  Salesa  Purchases  Dollar SalesC Do1 lar Purchases  Salesd  Purchases 
I------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I  I 
I  Constant  1  -2.3599  -2.5203  -2.3370  -2.2740 
I  1  (-5.3700)  (-7.T080)  (-8.3580)  (-8.3530) 
I 
1-r  target  b 
I 
I 









(Log 1 i  kel i  hood  I 
I  I 
ILikelihood ratio test  I 
I  I 
I  I 
ltorrectly predict4  1 
I  I 
ITotal observations  I 
I  I 
IObservations  at 1  1 
I  I 
JObservatiorrs at 0  I 
a  Prcbit fvwtion did  not converge. 
Not  discernible;  see teble 1. 
No  Jqwese dollar sales. 
~eme  as cquation I. 
Source:  Authors'  calculatians. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  3.2.6:  PROBIT  REACTICU  FUICTIOIS:  IYIERVENTICM AGAINST  GERMAN  UK!3 
Estimation Period:  Octakr 3,  1988  to February 23,  1990 
I US Dollar  US Dollar  Gem  Dollar Gem  Dollar Total Dollar  Total Dollar  I 
1  Sales  ~urchsses~  sales  ~urchascs~  Sales  Purchasesa  1 
I  I  I 
1  Constant  (  -0.243%  -0.20091  0.C6809  .  I 
I  1  (-0.51546)  (-0.41971)  (1.1082)  I 
I  I  I 
1-r  target  1  -26.518  -12.233  -20.628  I 
I  I  (-5.8200)  (-2.6663)  (-4.5298)  I 
I  I  I 
1 Louer  target  I  I 
I  I  I 
I  I  I 
I&preciation  1  0.68519  0.48785  0.39349  I 
I  1  (2.6105)  (1.8250)  (1.5005)  I 
I  I  I 
IDepreciation  I  I 
I  I  I 
I  I  I 
lh(t-1)  1  -1.3379  -1.2492  -1 -7716  I 
I  1  (-1.8383)  (-1.7120)  (-3.0664)  I 
I  I  I 
lLog  Likelihood  I  -164.80  -168.86  -191 -86  I 
I  I  I 
(Likelihood ratio test  (  38.7328  14.8535  34.4012  I 
I  I  (df=3)  (df=3)  (df =3)  I 
I  I  I 
(Correctly predicted  1  79.083%  79.083%  73.926%  I 
I  I  I 
ITotal observations  (  349  349  349  349  349  349  1 
I  I  I 
IWervations at 1  (  77  4  71  7  100  81 
I  I  I 
(Observations at 0  1  272  345  278  342  249  St  1  ............................................................................................................ 
a  Probit function wculd  not converge. 
Source:  Authors'  calculatf  ars. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTAsLE  3.2.5:  PROBIT  REACTlOW  FUICTIOIIS:  INTERbENTIOII AGAINST  JAPAJESE YEN 
Estirrtion Period:  Octakr 3,  1988  to Fckmry 23,  1990 
I  I US  Dollar  US  Dollar 
I  1  Sales  Purchases 
I-------------------------------------------------- 
I  I 
1 Constant  I  -2.1810  -0.0059 
I  1  (-7.3060)  (-0.1593) 
I  I 
1-r  target  (  -2O.SSSO 
I  I  (-4.4720) 
I  I 
ILower  target  I  67.2000 
I  I  (5.2920) 
I  I 
IAppreciatia  1  0.3910 
I  I  (1.3530) 
I  I 
IDepreciatia  I  0.4590 
I  I  (1.1180) 
I  I 
lh(t-1)  1  1.5110  -1.2510 
I  1  (3.6830)  (-1  -3730) 
I  I 
lLog  Likelihood  1  -143.57  -37.62 
I  I 
lLikelihwd ratio test  1  68.16  35.82 
I  I  (df=3)  (df =3) 
I  I 
(Correctly predicted  1  81.7%  96.3% 
I  I 
]Total  dervatiom  1  349  349 
I  I 
labscrvations  at 1  I  72  13 
I  I 




Japmese  Total Do1 Lar 
Dollar Purchases  Sales 
.------------------------------- 
Total Do1 lar  1 
Purchases  I 
.--------------  I 
I 
-1.2097  ( 





9s.1970  1 





-0.3200  I 
(-0.4470)  1 
I 
-1.1700  1 
(-1.1660)  1 
I 
-44.62  1 
I 
58.31  1 
(df=3)  I 
I 
96.0%  1 
I 
349  I 
I 
19  I 
I 
330  I 
Source:  Authors1  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 4 
Intervention Relative to the Target Exchange Rate 
(Numbers of inter~entions)~ 
I. Intervention  against the Mark-Dollar Exchange Rate 





Total Intervention  37 
Extramarginal  2  8 
Intramarginal  9 
German Sales  German Purchases 
135  Total Intervention  43 
101  Extramarginal  30 
34  fntramarginal  13 
Both Sales 
167  Total Intervention  54 
129  Extramarginal  38 
38  Intramarginal  16 
U.S. Sales  U.S. Purchases 
35  Total Intervent  ion  3  3 
32  Extramarginal  26 
3  Intramargina  1  7 
German Sales  German Purchases 
64  Total Intervention  3  6 
4  9  Extramarginal  28 
15  Intramarginal  8 
Both Sales 
6  7 
51 
18 
Total Intervent  ion  46 
Extramarginal  36 
Intramarginal  10 
C:  Second Subperiod: October 3. 1988 -  Februarv 23. 1990 
U.S. Sales  U.S. Purchases 
7  7  Total Intervention  4 
68  Extramarginal  2 
9  Intramarginal  2 
German Sales 
71  Total Intervention  7 
52  Extramarg  inal  2 
19  Intramarginal  5 
Both Sales 
100  Total Intervention  8 
78  Extramarginal  2 
2  2  Intramarginal  6 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4  (Continued) 
3  6 
11. Intervention  against the Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate 
6: Full Period: Februarv 23. 1987 -  Februarv 23. 1990 
U.  S. Sales 
8  5 
7  0 
15 
U.S. Purchases 
Total Intervention  65 
Extramarginal  59 
Intramarginal  6 
Ja~anese  Sales  Ja~anese  Purchases 
88  Total Intervention  105 
8  3  Extramarginal  8  8 






Total Intervention  112 
Extramarginal  93 
Intramarginal  19 
B:  First Subperiod: Februarv 23. 1987 -  September 30. 1988 
U.S. Sales  U.S. Purchases 
13  Total Intervention  52 
0  Extramarginal  4  6 
13  Intramarginal  6 
Japanese Sales  Japanese Purchases 
0  Total Intervention  8  9 
0  Extramarginal  72 
0  Intramarginal  17 
Both Sales  Both Purchases 
13  Total Intervention  93 
0  Extramarginal  74 
13  Intramarginal  19 




Total Intervention  13 
Extramarginal  13 
Intramarginal  0 
Ja~anese  Sales  Japanese Purchases 
88  Total Intervention  16 
8  3  Extramarginal  16 
5  Intramarginal  0 
Both Sales  Both Purchases 
103  Total Intervention  19 
97  Extramarginal  19 
6  Intramarginal  0 
a Margins based on exchange rates in Table 1. 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  5.0.G:  BASIC  EXCHANGE-RATE  EQIATIOU:  GEW  MARK 
Estimation Period:  February 23,  1987 to February  23,  1990 
Oepadent Variable:  Log ehmge  in  Closing Ibrk-Dollar Exchmge Rate 
........................................................................................ 
I  IEWATICU 1  EPUATICU  2  EWICU  3  EWATICU 4  (  I-----------------------------I--------------------------------------------------------  I 
1 I.  witiaml  ~km  I  I 
1  Castant  I  -0.011  -0.006  0.002  -0.W  I 
I  1  (-0.411)  (-0.159)  (0.253)  (-1.859)  I 
I  Interest-  rate spreads  I  0.263  1 
I  I  (2.290)  1 
I  US  holidey dumy  I  0.075  1 
I  I  (0.513)  1 
(  Gemnholidaydmay  I  -0.069  1 
I  I  (-0.426)  1 
111.  bnditiamlvariarc  (  I 
I  amJa  1  0.470  0.020  0.019  0.041  1 
I  (  (27.868)  (2.m)  (1.611)  (2.076)  1 
I  Alpha  I  0.052  0.042  0.021  I 
I  I  (3.862)  (2.436)  (1.287)  I 
1  Beta  I  0.907  0.914  0.8%  1 
I  I  (36.705)  (23.607)  (21.775)  1 
I  Interest-rate spreeds  1  -0.048  1 
I  I  (-2.117)  1 
I  Usholidaydumy  I  0.308  1 
I  I  (2.768)  1 
I  Gemnholideydumy  (  0.042  1 
I  I  (0.845)  1 
1  l/v  1  0.010  0.010  0.129  0.126  1 
I  1  (normel)  (notmal)  (fixed)  (fixed)  1 
I  I  I 
1111.  Di-tict  I  I 
(  Log 1  ikel  ihood  (  -788.340  -?7!5.570  -755.790  -742.890  1 
I  Unconditional variance  1  0.470  0.470  0.470  0.466  I 
I  01  for E/SPRT(H)  1  -0.030  -0.115  -0.105  -0.060  1 
I  BZforE/SPRT(H)  1  5.100  4.570  4.592  4.528  1 
I  Q(15)  for E  1  14.574  14.574  14.574  13.730  ( 
I  Q(15)  for E/SQRT(H)  1  14.574  13.353  13.446  16.114  ( 
1  Q(15)  for E-2  1  53.100  53.197  53.335  54.941  1 
I  Q(15)  for EHUH  1  53.100  21.462  22.295  17.021  ( 
I  Observations  I  757  757  757  757  1 
------------------------------------------------.--------------------------------------- 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  5.0.5:  BASIC  EXCHANGE-RATE  EQUTIOW:  JAPANESE  YEN 
Estimtion  Period:  February 23,  1987 to Fcbrtmry 23, 1990 
D&t  Variable:  Log Change  in  Closing Yen-Dollar  Excme  Rate 
Omeae  1  0.499 
1  (31.521) 
ALpha(1)  I 
I 
Beta( 1  )  I 
I 
Interest-  rate spree&  I 
I 
U.S.  holiday dumy  I 
I 
1  /v  I  0.010 
Diegmetics  I 
Log  1 i  kel  ihood  1  -815.64 
Uncmditional variencel  0.505 
B1  for E/SPRT(H)  1  0.066 
B2  for E/SPRT(H)  1  6.130 
Q(15)  for E  1  13.190 
Q(15)  for E/SQRT(H)  1  13.190 
Q(15)  for E-2  1  W.675 
Q(15)  for E-U(H)  1  W.675 
Ohervatiars  I  757 
Source:  Authors1  calculatiars. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  5.l.G:  BASIC  EXCHAIIGE-RATE  EQIATIOW:  GEM  WRK 
Estimation Period:  Fcbruclry D, 1987 to Septcntrr 30,  1988 
Dqxndcnt Variable:  Log Olmge  in  Closing Mark-Dollar Exchange  Rate 
.................................................................................................... 
I  IEWATICU 1  EWATICU 2  EWATICU  3  EWATICU  4  EWATICU  5  I  I--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  I 
I  I  I 
I I.  ~iti-L   em  I  I 
I  Constant  I  0.0032  0.0179  0.0113  -0.2268  -0.2146  1 
I  I  (0.05R)  (0.6082)  (0.3665)  (-2.3817)  (-2.2055)  1 
I  Interest-ratesprcedsl  0.5620  0.5446  1 
I  I  (2.9083)  (2.7668)  1 
I  I  I 
I  11.  Mitiansl  ~arirrc  (  I 
I  ane0e  1  0.-  0.0249  0.0259  0.0732  0.0819  1 
I  (  (21.87J)  (2.3683)  (1.3668)  (2.1034)  (2.0695)  1 
I  Alpha  I  0.0669  0.0557  0.0000  0.0000  I 
I  I  (2.9892)  (1  -8952)  (0.0000)  (0.0000>  I 
I  Beta  I  0.8759  0.8Tm  0.9096  0.9070  1 
I  I  (22.7740)  (13.0780)  (19.5060)  (18.7160)  1 
I  Interest-rate spreack I  -0.1045  -0.1191  I 
I  I  (-2.1261)  (-2.1165)  1 
(  U.S.  holiday &my  I  0.4355  0.4427  1 
I  I  (2.3345)  (2.2439)  1 
I  1 /N  I  0.0100  0.0100  0.1334  0.1334  0.1575  1 
I  I  (normel)  (norml)  (fixed)  (fixed)  (fixed)  I 
I  I  I 
1111.  Di-tia  I  I 
(  Log  Likelihood  (  -607.8300  -399.0100  -386.5600  -573.9400  -373.9000  1 
1  unconditional variance^  0.4323  0.4324  0.4323  0.4248  0.4251  1 
(  B1  for E/SQRT(H)  I  0.3422  0.1592  0.1747  0.0935  0.1095  1 
1  B2  for E/SQRT(H)  1  5.6309  4.  R01  4.7697  5.4351  5.5832  1 
(  P(15)  for E  1  17.1822  17.1822  17.1822  17.74%  17.7337  1 
I  Q(15)  for E/SQRT(H)  1  17.1822  15.6510  15.8105  15.1891  15.1985  ) 
I  Q(15)  for EC.2  (  31.9534  32.0919  32.0326  28.5511  28.68W  I 
I  P(15)  for EC.2/(H)  (  31.9534  11.1285  11.8946  7.3672  7.5780  1 
I  Obserwtiats  I  408  408  408  408  408  1  ................................................................................................... 
Scurce:  Authors1 calarlaticns. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  5.1  .J:  BASIC  EXCIUJIGE-RATE  EQIATION:  JAPANESE  YEN 
Estimation Period:  February 23,  1987 to  Septankr 30,  1988 





U.S.  holiday &my 
l/ru 
I  I 
I  I 
1111.  Dimtics  I 
1  Loglikelihood  I  - 
I  Uncaditiarel variance1 
I  BlforE/SPRT(H)  I 
(  B2  for E/SPRT(H)  I 
(  Q(15)forE  I 
I  Q(15)  for E/SQRT(H)  ( 
I  Q(15)forEn2  I 
I  Q(15)  for En2/(H)  I 
1  Observations  I 
(normal)  (normal) 
Scurce:  Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  5.2.G:  BASIC  EXCIUWGE-RATE  EQUTIOW:  EMAN  MARK 
Estimation Period:  Ottakr 3,  1988 to Fdmary 23,  1990 
Depadent Variable:  Log Chm  in  Closing IlerkQollar  Exchenge Rate 
I 
mitiam1  ken  I 
Constmt  I 
I 
Interest-rate sprh  1 
I 
I 
mitiam1  Varirrc  I 
Qnege  I 
I 
Alpha  I 
I 
Beta  I 
I 
Interest-rate spreads I 
I 
U.S.  holidey dmmy  I 
I 
Germen  holidey  I 
I 
1  /v  I 
I 
I 
Dimtics  I 
Log  likelihood  I 
Uncdi  tionel variance1 
81  for E/SPRT(H)  I 
82  for E/SPRT(H)  I 
~(15)  for E  I 
Q(15)forE/SQRT(H)  I 
a(i5)  for EC.2  I 
a(15)  for EC.U(H)  I 


































































Source:  Authors1 calculat  iaas. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  5.2.5:  BASIC  MCHAYGE-RATE  EQUTIW:  JAPANESE  YEN 
Estiantion Period:  Octokr 3,  1988  to Fekuary 23,  1990 
Dcpcndent  Variable:  Log Chm  in  Closing Yen-Dol lar Excharge Rate 
amese  I 
I 
Alpha(1)  I 
I 
Beta( 1  )  I 
I 
Interest-rate spread  I 
I 
Holiday &my  I 
I 
l/w  I 
I 
1  LogLikelihood  I 
I  Uncaditional varience  I 
I  B1  for E/SQRT(Q)  I 
I  B2  for E/SQRT(Q)  I 
I  Q(15) for E  I 
1  Q(15)forE/SQRT(H)  I 
(  Q(15)  for E-2  I 
1  Q(15)  for EHU(H)  I 
I  Observatiars  I 
Source:  Authors8 calculatiars. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  6.0.G:  EXCHAIICE-RATE  EQUTION UITH  INTERVENTION AGAINST  QRlUll  HARKS 
Estimtian  Period:  February 23,  1987 to Febmry  23,  l9W 
Dependent Varieble:  Log Charge  in  the Closi~  Mark-Dollar  Excharrge Rate 
I  lEWATIoW  1  EWION  2  1)  IEQUATION 1  EQUATION 2  I 
I----------------------------I----------------------------l  l---------------------------l---------------------------- 
1 I. Caditiara1 lleen 
I 
I  11111.  Dimtics 
I  Corstant  1  -0.13% 
I  I 
-0.1265  (1  LogLikelihood  1  -734.9500  -732.7300  1 
1  1  (-2.9247)  (-2.7593)  11  Unconditio~l  varimce(  0.4629  0.4583  1 
I  Interest-rate spreads  (  0.3065  0.3600  ( 1  B1  for E/SPRT(H)  I  -0.0256  -0.0155  I 
I  1  (3.2791)  (3.1864)  11  82  for E/SPRT(H)  1  4.1700  4.2211  1 
I  US  holiday dumy  1  0.1048  0.1156  11  Q(15)  for E  1  12.0666  11.m7  I 
I  1  (0.6598)  (0.7997)  1  Q(15)  for E/SPRT(H)  1  13.5644  12.9838  1 
I  Germen holiday dumy  1  -0.0602  -0.0748  I I  Q(15)  for P2  1  60.1183  56.6346  1 
I  (  (-0.3865)  (-0.4466)  11  Q(15)  for Ef*2/H  1  19.2754  17.9283  1 
I  USdollarplrchases  1  -0.1111  ( I  abscrvations  I  757  757  1 
I  I  (-1.5770)  II--------------------------------------------------------- 
I  US  dollar sales  1  0.04%  I  ISource:  Authors'  calculatiars. 
I  1  (1.1241)  I  I 
I  &man  do1 lar plrchases I  0.0023  I  I 
I  I  (O.los0)  I I 
I  Germen dollar sales  (  -0.1271  I I 
I  I  (-1.8550)  I I 
I  Total dollar plrchases  I  -0.1996  (1 
I  I  (-4.2815)  11 
I  Total dollar sales  I  0.0674  11 
I  I  (1.9604)  (1 
I  I  I I 
1 11.  Caditiara1 Varierrc  I  I I 
I  I  I  I 
I  anega  I  o.oni  0.0458  11 
I  (  (2.8903)  (2.2328)  11 
I  Alpha  I  0.0304  0.0257  11 
I  1  (1.5012)  (1.4%)  11 
I  Beta  1  0.0457  O.ss32  I  ( 
I  1  (17.4451)  (20.7588)  11 
I  Interest-rate spreads  1  -0.0899  -0.0527  11 
I  1  (-2.3288)  (-2.1299)  11 
I  US holiday dumy  1  0.3189  0.2855  (1 
I  1  (2.3288)  (2.5026)  11 
1  Germen holiday dumy  1  0.0087  0.0173  (1 
I  1  (0.1675)  (0.3567)  11 
I  USdollarplrchases  (  0.0384  I  I 
I  1  (0.8963)  I  I 
I  US dollar sales  I  -0.0293  I  I 
I  (  (-1.6226)  I  I 
1  Germen do1 lar plrchases  1  0.0081  I  I 
I  1  (0.2106)  I  I 
I  Germen dollar sales  (  0.0226  I  I 
I  1  (1.6766)  I  I 
I  Total dollar purchases  I  0.0184  I  ( 
I  I  (0.9950,  I  I 
I  Total dot tar sales  I  0.0044  11 
I  I  (0.6857)  11 
I  l/v  1  0.1094  0.1123  11 
I  I  (fixed)  (fixed)  11  ............................................................ 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm44 
TABLE  6.0.5:  EXCW-RATE  EWATIOll UITH  IYTERVEYTIOll  AGAINST  JAPANESE  YEN 
Jepanoe Yen  Estimtion Period:  February 23,  1987 to Febwary 23,  1988 
Dependent  Varible:  Log Cme  in  Closi~  Yen-Dollar  Exchange Rate  ......................................................................................... 
I  IEUTIOll 1  EQJATIOll  2  EUTIOll 3  EUTIW 4  I 
) I.  miti-1  krr  I 
I  Carstent  I 
I  I 
I  Interest-rate spreads  1 
I  I 
I  Total dollar purchases  I 
I  I 
(  Total dollar sales  I 
I  I 
I  U.S.  dollar purchases  I 
I  I 
I  U.S.  dollar sales  I 
I  I 
1  Japimse dollar purchsscsl 
I  I 
I  Japmese dollar sales  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  11.  Cuditicml  Varirrc  I 
I  -*  I 
I  I 
I  Alpha  I 
I  I 
1  Beta  I 
I  I 
I  Interest-rate spreads  I 
I  I 
I  Holiday  I 
I  I 
I  Total dollar purchases  ( 
I  I 
1  Total dollar sales  I 
I  I 
I  U.S.  dollar purchases  I 
I  I 
1  U.S.  dollar sales  I 
I  I 
(  Japanese dollar purchases  1 
I  I 
I  Japanese dollar sales  I 
I  I 
1  l/v  I 
I  I 
I  I 
1111.  Dimtia  I 
I  Log  likelihood  I 
1  Uncaditiml  variame  I 
(  BlforE/SQRT(H)  I 
1  02 for E/SQRT(H)  I 
1  Q(15)forE  I 
I  PC151  for E/=T<H)  I 
I  Q<15)forEn2  I 
(  Q(15)  for EnU<H)  I 
(  Observiltims  I  ................................... 
Source:  Authors1  calculatiars. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  6.1  .G:  EXCHAIIGE-RATE  EQUTlON Ul  TH  lNTERVENTION  AWlNST QW  MARKS 
Estimtion  Period:  Febmnry 23,  1987 to  October 3,  1988 
Dependent Variable:  Log Change  in  the Glaring Werk-Dollar  Exchange Rate 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
I  lEQUTlON 1  EQUATIOW 2  EQUTlCM 3  EQUATlON4  EQUTlON 5  EQUATION  6  EQUTlON 7  I---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
11.  Conditi-Lkut  I 
Cmtmt  I 
I 
Interest-rate spreads  I 
1 
U.S.  dollar purchases  1 
I 
U.S.  dollar sales  I 
I 
Gcrnan do1  Lar prchases( 
I 
Gemndollarsales  1 
I 
Total dollar purchases I 
I 
Total dollar sales  I 
I 
I 
taditiml Variarc  I 
anese  I 
I 
A Lpha  I 
I 
Beta  I 
I 
Interest-rate spreads  1 
I 
U.S.  holiday cimv  I 
I 
U.S.  dollar purchases  I 
I 
U.S.  dollar sales  I 
I 
Genmn do1  lar purchases  1 
I 
Total do1  lar purchases  1 
I 
Total dollar sales  I 
I 
l/v  I 
I 
I 
Di.gp.tiu  I 
Log  likelihood  I 
Unccndi timl variance  1 
81  for E/SPRT(H)  I 
62  for E/SPRT(H)  I 
Q(15)  for E  I 
Q(15)  for E/SQRT<H)  I 
Q(15)  for En2  I 
Q(15)  for En2/(H)  I 
Olxervat i  om  I 
0.0527 
(0.%90) 
-0.2732  1 
(-4.9760)  1 
I 
I 
0.0652  I 
(2.3470)  1 
0.0000  1 
(0.0000)  1 
0.9096  1 
(18.3760)  ) 
-0.0927  I 
(-2.3270)  1 
0.4320  1 







0.0143  1 
(1.5070)  1 
0.0164  1 
(0.8530)  1 
0.1060  1 
(fixed)  1 
I 
I 
-363.0900  1 
0.4073  1 
0.2565  1 
4.1200  I 
12.6829  1 
12.7956  ( 
n.9430  I 
14.3391  ) 
408  1  ------------- 
-0.0300 
(-1.0480) 




0.1126  0.1575 
(fixed)  (fixed) 
0.1575  0.1575 
(fixed)  (fixed) 
0.1126  0.1126 
(fixed)  (fixed) 
Source:  Authors'  calculatiars. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  6.1.5:  EZM-RATE  EQUTIOY  WITH  IWTERVEWTIOY  AGAINST  JAPANESE  YEN 
Japacse Yen Estiuntian Period:  Fetrmry 23,  1987 to  Septcmkr 30,  1m 
( I.  brditiamllla  I 
I  Ccnstmt  I 
I  I 
1  Interest-rate sprd  I 
I  I 
(  Total dollar plrchascn  I 
I  I 
I  Total dollar salts  1 
I  I 
I  U.S.  dollar purchases  I 
I  I 
I  u.S.  dollar sales  I 
I  I 
I  Jqwrcse dollar purchlrsesl 
I  I 
1  Japanese dollar sales  I 
I  I 
I  I 
(11.  brditiaml  Vsrint  I 
I  omse  I 
I  I 
I  Alpha  I 
I  I 
1  Beta  I 
I  I 
I  Interest-rate spreads  ( 
I  I 
I  Holiday  I 
I  I 
I  Total do1  lar plrchsses  I 
I  I 
I  Total dollar sales  I 
I  I 
I  U.S.  dollar plrchases  1 
I  I 
(  U.S.  dollar sales  I 
I  I 
1  Jepanese do1  tar purchases  1 
I  I 
I  Japanese dollar sales  I 
I  I 
I  l/v  I 
I  I 
I  I 
1111.  Di-tia  I 
I  Log  1  ikel  ihood  I 
I  Uncaditimal variarce  I 
I  BI  for  E/SPRT(H)  I 
I  BZforE/SPRT(H)  I 
(  Q(15) for  E  I 
I  Q(15)  for E/SaRT(H)  I 
(  Q(15)  for E-2  I 
I  Q(15)  for EwU(H)  I 
I  Observatiarr,  I 
------------------I--------------- 
SCUrCe:  Author's  calwlatias. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  6.2.6:  EXCHAYCE-RATE  EQUTIOW UITH  INTERENTIOW  ACAIYST QW  llARrS 
Estimation Period:  Octakr 3,  1980 to February 23,  1990 
Depcndcnt Variable:  Log  ehmge in  Closing Ibrk-Dollar Exchmge Rate  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.---- 
I  IEUTICU 1  EUTICU2  EWATION3  EWATICU4  (  I-----------------------------------I--------------*-----------------------------------------  I 
US  dollar sales 
German  dollar sales 
Total dollar sales 
Alpha 
US  holiday 
German  holiday &my 
US  dollar sales 
German  dollar sales 
Total dollar sales 
Diwtics 
Log  1  ikelihood 
~ncaditi-1  variarce 
B1  for E/SORT(H) 
82  for E/SORT(Hl 
Q(15)  for E 
Q(15) for E/SQRT(H) 
Q(15) for E-2 
Q(15)  for EwUH 












































































































Source:  Authors1 calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE  6.2.5:  EXCHIJICE-RATE  EQUTlOW  WITH  INTERVENTIOW  AGAINST  JAPANESE  YEN 
Estimtion  Period:  Octckr 3,  1988  to February  23, 1990 
Dcpadent Variable:  Log Chmge  in  the Closing Yen-Do1  lar Exchwe Rate  ....................................................................................................... 
I I.  brditiamlm  I 
I  constat  I 
I  I 
I  Interest-rate spree&  1 
I  I 
I  Total dollar prrchases  I 
I  I 
I  Total dollar sales  I 
I  I 
1  U.S.dollarprrcheses  I 
I  I 
(  U.S.  dollar sales  I 
I  I 
I  Japanese do1  Lar purchases  1 
I  I 
I  Japanese dollar sales  I 
I  I 
I  I 
111.  Caditiam1  Variarrr  I 
I  -  1 
I  I 
I  Alpha  I 
I  I 
I  Beta  I 
I  I 
I  Interest-rate sprd  1 
I  I 
I  Holiday  I 
I  I 
1  Total do1 lar prrchases  I 
I  I 
I  Total dollar sales  I 
I  I 
(  U.S.  dollar purchases  1 
I  I 
I  U.S.  dollar sales  I 
I  I 
I  Jepwse do1 lar pchwesl 
I  I 
I  Japsnese dollar sales  ( 
I  I 
I  l/v  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I I  I  I.  Dimtics  I 
I  Log  Likelihood  I 
I  Uncditimlvariance  I 
I  BI  for E/SPRT(H)  I 
I  BtforE/SQRT(H)  I 
1  ~(15)  for E  I 
1  Q(15)  for E/SPRT(H)  1 
(  Q(15) for E-2  I 
(  Q(15) for En2/(H)  I 
I  Observations  I  .................................. 
Source:  Authors1 calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAPPENDIX A:  Data Description 
We use  the  following data series either  to  estimate  the model  or  to 
construct variables.  The data  sets  contain  761  observations beginning  on 
February  23, 1990.  We  estimate all  of the  models  beginning at the  fifth 
observation, February 20, 1987, the day before  the G7 met.  We utilize 757 
observations. 
Interest rates: 
ibnk  West German 3-month  interbank rate.  DRIFACS PLUS. 
genski  Japanese Gensaki 3-month  rate.  DRIFACS PLUS. 







ivnof  rl 
jvnofr5 
ivnofr5 
mark-dollar  exchange rate;  morning-opening  bid.  FRBNY 
mark-dollar  exchange rate;  morning-opening  offer.  FRBNY 
mark-dollar  exchange rate;  closing bid.  FRBNY 
mark-dollar  exchange rate;  closing offer.  FRBNY 
yen-dollar  exchange rate;  morning-opening  bid.  FRBNY 
yen-dollar  exchange rate;  morning-opening  offer.  FRBNY 
yen-dollar  exchange rate;  closing bid.  FRBNY 
yen-dollar  exchange rate;  closing offer.  FRBNY 
Target Zone Variables  (see table 1): 
lowtare  mark-dollar  rate at  which the U.  S. tended to purchase dollars. 
hi~htarg  mark-dollar  rate at which the U.S. tended to sell dollars. 
lowyen  yen-dollar  rate at which the U.S. tended to buy dollars. 
highyen  yen-dollar  rate at which the U.S. tended to sell dollars. 
Dummy Variables 
ushol  dummy variable equal to 1 on the day after a U.S.  holiday.  On 
U.S. holidays, exchange-rate  data were either missing 
or incomplete.  Any intervention on U.S. holidays was 
added to the previous observation. 
gerhol  dummy variable for German holidays.  If the NY market 
was open,  we replaced any missing German interest-rate 
observation with the rate on the previous day.  There 
were 20 German holidays. 
i  a~hol  dummy variable for Japanese holidays.  If the NY market 
was open,  we replaced any missing Japanese 
interest-rate  observation with the rate on the 
previous day.  There were 33 Japanese holidays. 
mondum  dummy variable equal to one on Mondays. 
weddum  dummy variable equal to one on Wednesdays. 
thudum  dummy variable equal to one on Thursdays. 
fridum  dummy variable equal to one on Fridays. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm